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Iconizing the Digital Humanities. Models and 
Modeling from a Semiotic Perspective 
Claas Lattmann ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Ikonisierung der Digital Humanities. Modelle und Modellierung aus 
einer semiotischen Perspektive«. Models are ubiquitous in the digital humanities. 
Against the backdrop of the recent discussion in the philosophy of science 
about what models are and what they do, this paper presents a semiotic per-
spective on models in the framework of Charles S. Peirce’s theory of signs that 
sheds light on the practice of modeling in the digital humanities. As a first step, 
it is argued that models are icons, i.e. signs that represent their specific objects 
by being regarded as similar to them; and that there are, in all, three basic 
types of model, namely “images,” “diagrams,” and “metaphors.” A second step 
explicates relevant implications of this model-theoretic approach, especially as 
they relate to the digital humanities. In particular, it is shown that models are 
not identical to the things they represent and that they only represent them 
partially; that the representation operates on the basis of a mapping relation 
between select properties of the model and its object; that each model and 
each instance of modeling has a theoretical framework; and that models are 
the true basis for genuine creativity and progress in research. 
Keywords: Models, icons, images, diagrams, metaphors, C. S. Peirce, Digital 
Humanities. 
1.  Iconic Perspectives on Digital Humanities 
Modeling is as ubiquitous in the digital humanities as it is in today’s scientific 
research.1 Scholars use models for creating an ever-growing number of compu-
tational tools that expand the breadth and depth of humanities research. The 
traditional objects of study are transferred into the digital realm by being 
“modeled” by computers so that computations can be done that provide new 
and, if possible, exact insights. Modeling in the digital humanities opens up 
                                                             
∗  Claas Lattmann, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Institut für Klassische Altertums-
kunde, Leibnizstraße 8, 24098 Kiel, Germany; clattmann@email.uni-kiel.de. 
1  Models play an ever-growing role in contemporary science: see Bailer-Jones (2009) and 
Frigg and Hartmann (2017); cf. Thalheim and Nissen (2015a) with case studies from a di-
verse range of research fields. On models in the digital humanities, see McCarty (2005, 20-
72), and Ciula and Marras (2016); for a general perspective, see Schreibman, Siemens and 
Unsworth (2004, 2016).  
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new avenues of research and at the same time reshapes the way scholars do 
their investigations.  
This computational turn, or at least digital expansion of traditional method-
ology, takes place all over the humanities and, to a varying degree, affects all 
fields of study, both in research and in teaching. In particular, this holds true 
for Classical Studies, an area that was among the first to embrace the digital 
age.2 To give just a few examples, scholars of Greco-Roman antiquity have 
created digital 3D models of ancient buildings;3 interactive mapping tools to 
explore ancient landscapes and travel routes;4 network models of the axiomat-
ic-deductive relations among proofs in ancient mathematics;5 models of the 
materiality of the medieval manuscripts that contain the ancient texts;6 models 
of citation networks of references to ancient texts in modern scholarly litera-
ture;7 large-scale databanks that contain analyses of the syntactic structures 
ancient texts exhibit;8 digital editions of Greek and Latin texts;9 and corpus-
                                                             
2  For the early development of computational approaches in Classical Studies, see Solomon 
(1993); for a more recent account see Crane (2004). One of the first and most long-lived 
projects in the digital humanities is the “Thesaurus Linguae Graecae” (TLG), a databank of 
ancient Greek literature that began in 1972 (<http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu>); for a history of 
the project see Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (2017). Another long-lived project in Classical 
Studies is the “Perseus Digital Library,” which began in 1985 (<http://www.perseus. 
tufts.edu>); its core is a large-scale collection of texts and other testimonies from ancient 
Greco-Roman culture, including pictures of material remnants and scholarly literature. In-
terestingly, the systematic use of models in order to acquire objective, “scientific” 
knowledge seems to have been invented in ancient Greece itself; see Lattmann (2015). In 
any case, the first attestation of a word for model, “parádeigma,” belongs to an inscription 
in the so-called Tunnel of Eupalinos on the Greek island of Samos, which was built in the 
6th century BCE; see Käppel (1999).  
3  E.g., of the Athenian Acropolis: see Tsingas (2012). Cf. The Digital Institute for Archaeology’s 
“The Million Image Database” project (<http://www.millionimage.org.uk/>). 
4  Cf. the “Ancient World Mapping Center. ‘À-la-carte’” project that allows the GIS-based 
creation of custom maps for ancient Greece and Rome on the basis of historical cartograph-
ic material (<http://awmc.unc.edu/awmc/applications/alacarte/>). For the modeling of an-
cient travel routes see, e.g., “ORBIS: The Stanford Geospatial Network Model of the Roman 
World” (<http://orbis.stanford.edu>). Cf. interaction models as described by Nakoinz (2013); 
see also Nakoinz and Hinz (2015). 
5  Cf. Schiefsky (2007). 
6  Cf. Campagnolo (2015). 
7  Cf. Romanello (2016). 
8  Cf. the efforts relating to building large-scale treebanks, with the goal of creating a basis 
for comprehensive computational linguistic analyses: see, e.g., the “Ancient Greek and Latin 
Dependency Treebank (AGLDT)” (<https://perseusdl.github.io/treebank_data/>) project that 
was started in 2016; cf. Mambrini (2016) and see Bamman and Crane (2010, 2011).  
9  See the “Homer Multitext” project (<http://www.homermultitext.org/>); cf. Crane (2010) 
and Almas and Beaulieu (2013). Often these editions allow various analyses of the textual 
material; cf. the “Digital Athenaeus” project (<http://digitalathenaeus.org/>) that aims at 
providing the tools for analyzing text reuse and sources of quotations; for the latter, cf. 
Bozia (2016), Celano, Crane and Majidi (2016), and Gorman and Gorman (2016). For another 
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based digital lexica that use sophisticated statistical methods.10 Despite the 
apparent diversity of these tools that provide new perspectives on, and methods 
for investigating, the traditional objects of research in Classical Studies,11 it is 
clear that they are nothing but, or at their core rely upon, digital versions or 
“models” of those objects proper which they are meant to stand for.12   
As essential as models are for the digital humanities, they are not mere tools 
that do not exert any influence on what scholars are investigating. Quite the 
contrary, models shape what we see to a considerable degree, and it is arguably 
the case that they even determine what we can see. For example, if we create a 
digital political map of ancient Greece, by investigating this model we might 
only find out what the borders of the Greek states were, but we cannot discern, 
e.g., which cultural relations existed between the single parts of Greece, be-
yond and independently of the political landscape; moreover, this model might 
be understood as implying that there actually was something in antiquity that 
was identical to “borders” in the modern sense. To give another example, if we 
model ancient travel with direct distance as the only criterion for choosing 
routes, we cannot see that the primary factor in making a travel decision might 
instead have been the travel costs in terms of time and expenses.13  
In principle, it is not the original, “real” object that we access in the digital 
humanities, but a substitute, i.e. the “model,” which we ourselves create, ex-
plore, investigate, and manipulate. But how exactly do digital models relate to 
their original objects? What are the conditions under which we may use them? 
What are, after all, the advantages and disadvantages, the limitations and bene-
fits of models? In view of the ever-growing importance of digital models in the 
                                                                                                                                
example, see Bernstein, Gervais and Lin (2015); cf. the “Tesserae Project” (<http://tesserae. 
caset.buffalo.edu/>).  
10  See, e.g., Bamman and Crane (2009), in particular for their discussion of some of the differ-
ences in scope and method when compared to traditional lexica, such as the standard 
“Greek-English Lexicon” by Liddell et al. (1996 [1940]). 
11  Another example of how digital technologies might change traditional research and teach-
ing is the “Perseids” Project, which is nested into the “Perseus Digital Library” and imple-
ments crowdsourcing approaches: cf. the project homepage (<http://sites.tufts.edu/ 
perseids/>) and see Almas and Beaulieu (2016). 
12  Cf. Ciula and Marras (2016) as well as McCarty (2004) who locates “modelling” at the core 
of the digital humanities and contends that it “points the way to a computing that is of as 
well as in the humanities: a continual process of coming to know by manipulating represen-
tations.” However, McCarty’s position differs from the perspective taken here insofar as he 
sees modeling only as a heuristic tool and “essentially a quest for meaningful failure”: “The 
best model of something, that is, comes as close as possible to what we think we know 
about the thing in question yet fails to duplicate perfectly that knowledge” (both quotes 
McCarty (2003, 1232)). For a more in-depth discussion of this position, see McCarty (2005, 
20-72).  
13  See Scheidel (2014) on the rationale of the “ORBIS: The Stanford Geospatial Network Model 
of the Roman World” project (<http://orbis.stanford.edu>). 
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humanities, it is of paramount importance to be able to give sufficient answers 
to these questions.  
Seldom though do the practitioners of the field seem to be interested in ex-
ploring such abstract and at their core philosophical issues.14 To a certain de-
gree, this is to be expected and, admittedly, justified, for modeling is an inher-
ently practical activity and as such it does not necessarily require that we have 
a sophisticated theory of models. Moreover, there is a confusing variety of 
model-theoretic approaches in the scholarly literature from divergent and often 
incompatible perspectives.15 In consequence, it seems to be all but impossible 
to adequately define and comprehensively explore the notions of “models” and 
“modeling,” even if only in order to sharpen our methodological toolkit for 
practical purposes.  
This situation should not be surprising. Apparently, it is caused by the spe-
cific nature of the subject matter itself. As the small number of examples of 
digital models in Classical Studies given above already suggests, it does not 
seem to make much sense to try to apply the label “model” to all the divergent 
things that are commonly called “model.” After all, there does not seem to be 
“the” model, but only “models,” and this only in a very loose sense; after all, it 
is hard to see what all these “models” could have in common. What, for exam-
ple, does a digital map have in common with a treebank; or what does a biblio-
graphical model have in common with a 3D reconstruction of an ancient temple 
or a robot model of a Roman gladiator? Apart from being something “digital,” 
there does not seem to be any single characteristic property (or set of proper-
ties) that these things share with one another. The word “model” might just be 
a highly polysemous word so that the search for a general theory of model 
might be futile and, in any case, not worth the effort. 
This paper disagrees. It will, first, sketch an answer as to whether there is a 
universal definition of model that covers all the models used in the digital 
humanities (and beyond) in the affirmative.16 This model-theoretic approach 
operates in the semiotic framework of Charles S. Peirce’s theory of signs and 
proposes that models are a specific form of sign, namely icons, i.e. signs that 
                                                             
14  However, cf. McCarty (2005, 20-72). To be sure, the situation is similar to that in theoretical 
science: see Gähde and Hartmann (2013).  
15  For an overview, see Bailer-Jones (2009), Frigg and Hartmann (2017), and Frigg and Nguyen 
(2017); for a brief account of the history of model theory, see Morrison and Morgan 
(1999b). Cf. Thalheim and Nissen (2015b, 2015c) as well as Nissen and Thalheim (2015a, 
2015b, 2015c). 
16  I have put forward this model-theoretic approach together with Björn Kralemann else-
where; here I can only present the outlines of this theory and, especially in section 3, point 
out some ramifications for our understanding of digital humanities as a genuinely model-
based field. For a fuller account, see Kralemann and Lattmann (2013a, 2013b) and cf. 
Lattmann (2012, 2015, 2016); cf. Gallegos (2018). Nonetheless, I will take the opportunity to 
more fully explicate some of the relevant implications of this approach, especially as they 
relate to modeling in the digital humanities. 
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are defined as being similar to what they represent.17 A second step will trace 
relevant implications of this understanding of models that will provide insights 
into what we can and cannot hope, and try, to achieve by modeling and thus in 
digital humanities at large. This section will demonstrate that it is not only 
possible to give a universal definition of model, but that it might also be helpful 
to do so.  
2. Iconizing Models 
Modeling is an essential feature of using computers as a research tool, whether 
in science or in the humanities. In order to compute anything, one has to build 
and use models that resemble those things outside the computer about which 
the sought-for computations shall be made, whether these things are physical 
objects or theoretical concepts or whatever else.18 The inherent reliance of 
computing on models is readily apparent at the higher levels of computing, for 
example in object-oriented programming languages, for they are based on the 
idea of modeling software objects that are, due to some sort of similarity, re-
garded as equivalent to things existing in the “real” world, here those things 
scholars are interested in investigating in the first place, such as the original 
Greek and Latin texts themselves.19  
It directly follows that digital models are categorically different from their 
original objects and, in principle, not identical to them. Rather, they stand for 
                                                             
17  There are certain similarities to other approaches that understand models as signs in the 
framework of Peircean semiotics; cf., e.g., Ljungberg (2016). Among the main differences, 
though, are the following two points: here, the notions of model and icon are strictly iden-
tified; and second, other model-theoretic approaches are integrated into the overarching 
semiotic framework. These are, first, the model-theoretic approach of modern logic (see, 
e.g., Balzer (1997); cf. Hodges (2013); for an account of its earlier development, see Chang 
(1974) and Vaught (1974)); and second, those model-theoretic approaches that describe 
models from the viewpoint of the concept of mapping (see, e.g., Stachowiak (1973); cf. 
Giere (1999, 2004), Suárez (2003, 2004), Frigg (2006)). 
18  For clarity’s sake and to avoid misunderstandings, it is important to stress that the notion of 
“reality” shall be understood in a broad sense as implying that something has the capacity 
of actually affecting and/or acting upon another thing. In the terms of Peirce’s theory, this 
amounts to something’s being a phenomenon of “secondness.” The intricate question, 
though, as to what “‘reality” exactly meant for Peirce has been controversially discussed; for 
some insights see Mayorga (2007) and cf. below. 
19  This is the case even at the most basic level of computing, for the electric states of comput-
ers represent, and stand for, those numbers (etc.) that make up the relevant (abstract or 
specific) data structures (etc.). That computers have a basically semantic (or semiotic) nature 
is evident in view of the general characteristics of the Turing machine, as which each com-
puter can be described, for the two core components of the Turing machine, “program” and 
“data,” are conceived of as categorically separate, with the “data” by definition having a 
“symbolic” (and that is semiotic) nature; cf. Barker-Plummer (2016).  
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and “represent” these objects as their ontologically separate substitute in the 
digital realm.20 Insofar as representations are nothing but signs and signs can be 
investigated via semiotics, the general theory of signs, we have to take a semi-
otic perspective and explore models as signs. For this aim the sign theory de-
veloped by the American philosopher Charles S. Peirce is well-suited, especial-
ly because it is embedded in a comprehensive and powerful epistemological 
framework.21  
What then is a sign? Peirce defines it as “something which stands to some-
body for something in some respect or capacity” (Peirce CP 2.228), that is, a 
sign is conceived of as something that is an element of a relational structure 
that is established by an intentional action, that is, by someone’s using some-
thing as a sign. Anything can (and does) act as a “sign” if and insofar as, for 
some person (or, more generally, entity that is capable of establishing a sign 
relation, including computers) it represents some “object” and, to continue 
quoting Peirce’s definition, “creates in the mind of that person an equivalent 
sign, or perhaps a more developed sign,” the so-called “interpretant” (Peirce 
CP 2.228).22  
                                                             
20  For clarity’s sake, I should stress that a representation does not necessarily need to be 
(whatever that means) “realistic” or “naturalistic,” e.g., as one might conceive of a photog-
raphy. If something represents another thing, this just means that, in someone’s judgment, 
the one thing stands for the other thing. Evidently, this can be the case even if there is no 
resemblance at all, such as when we use the demonstrative pronoun “this” in order to deic-
tically point to something. On the other hand, neither a representational nor a similarity 
relation implies that one of the relata must be a simplified version of the other; for this 
widespread view see, e.g., McCarty (2004). In effect, models can be as complex as their orig-
inal objects and maybe even more complex; for example, an exact replica of a human being 
could be classified as a model, even if under most circumstances it probably might not be a 
very useful one for research purposes.  
21  This is not meant to imply that there are no other sign theories. Quite the contrary. Howev-
er, taking Peirce’s theory as the basis for formulating a model-theoretic approach is justified 
by the fact that it is sufficiently well-suited for describing models as representational (and 
thus) semiotic phenomena; and that it allows us to neatly integrate other model-theoretic 
approaches. For an overview of sign theories, see, e.g., Copley (2001); for more detailed in-
sights into Peirce’s theory of signs, see Short (2007), Atkin (2013), and cf. Colapietro and 
Olshewsky (1996).  
22  Cf. the full quotation at Peirce CP 2.228: a sign “addresses somebody, that is, creates in the 
mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which 
it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It 
stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have 
sometimes called the ground of the representamen.” Cf. Peirce CP 1.564: “A representation 
is that character of a thing by virtue of which, for the production of a certain mental effect, 
it may stand in place of another thing. The thing having this character I term a representa-
men, the mental effect, or thought, its interpretant, the thing for which it stands, its ob-
ject.” Cf. Peirce MS 318 (1907) where Peirce defines the object as the antecedent to the sign 
and the interpretant as the subsequent to it: “The object is what the sign finds; the meaning 
[or Interpretant] is what the sign leaves.”  
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It directly follows that the things used as signs as well as their objects are, 
on the one hand, not confined to physical objects (i.e., qua physical object). 
Among other things, we can use words such as “unicorn” to let them stand for 
non-physical, abstract concepts and imagined things like a unicorn.23 On the 
other hand, the notion of sign is not confined to “linguistic” signs either as they 
are commonly understood. For example, a wind rose can, by pointing some-
where, “stand for” and “represent” the actual direction of the wind at a given 
moment in time. By definition, anything can be a sign if and insofar as it is 
used to “stand for” and thus “represent” something else. Something being a 
sign is no inherent property of any specific thing, but belongs to, and is due to, 
the realm of semiotic practice.  
In sum, Peirce’s definition of sign provides a broad conceptual understand-
ing of signs. They are not bound to any specific form of manifestation or medi-
um. Not only words, but also images, sounds, feelings and so on can be used as 
and, thus, be signs. The definition of sign in particular applies to all those 
things that are commonly classified as models, among them smaller or larger 
replicas of things, mathematical formulas, computer simulations, and digital 
visualizations.24  
Given the general definition of sign, though, it is obvious that models cannot 
be signs simpliciter. While it is clear that every model is a sign, there evidently 
are signs that are not models. For example, the word “word” is, when used as 
such, a sign, but it is not a model for anything, at least not for its meaning 
proper, “word.” It follows that we have to determine whether there is any spe-
cific and clearly-defined sub-form of sign that can be called “model.”  
At first sight, this does not seem to be the case, given the vast variety of 
things that are called “models.” This impression, however, is mistaken, for 
actually, there is one type of sign that can be identified with models, namely 
“icons.” Icons are one of the classes of sign resulting from Peirce’s exhaustive 
classification of all signs into the three classes of “icons,” “indices,” and “sym-
bols” by way of differentiating the specific quality of the relation between the 
sign and its object.25  
                                                             
23  Of course, distinguishing degrees (or modes) of reality prompts quite intricate philosophical 
questions. As mentioned above, “reality” shall here just be taken to mean that, loosely 
speaking, something has an actual effect on something else; for this to be the case it does 
not matter what the specific mode of being of these things is. Cf. Peirce MS 339 (note of 
April 3, 1906). 
24  It should be stressed that all direct relata of the sign relation are signs; cf. Peirce CP 2.303 
and see Peirce MS 318 (1907) and MS 339 (note of October 23, 1906). Signification, there-
fore, has a genuinely semiotic nature; cf. Peirce CP 1.339. A consequence is that we have to 
distinguish between different types of objects (two) and interpretants (three), explicating 
which aspect of Peirce’s theory would lead too far here; for some details, see Jappy (2016).  
25  As according to Peirce CP 2.243, the basic criterion for this classification is whether “the 
relation of the sign to its object consists in the sign’s having some character in itself, or in 
some existential relation to that object, or in its relation to an interpretant.” It would lead 
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Let us briefly review these three types of sign in order to understand the 
specific characteristics of icons and, thus, models: first, a “symbol” represents 
its object by standing for it because of convention or habitualization. Examples 
are regular words, for they represent their objects because they are commonly 
used in order that they represent them. The word “word” stands for a “word” 
only because it has been made to do so at some point in time and people have 
continued using the word in that way ever since. Second, an “index” represents 
its object by standing for it because of an actual connection to it. A wind rose, 
for example, is an index that represents the direction of the wind at a specific 
moment in time, if and insofar as it is at this given moment in time actually 
affected by the wind. Third and finally, an “icon” represents its object by being 
regarded as possessing a similarity or resemblance to its object. It is defined as 
“a Representamen whose Representative Quality is a Firstness of it as a First. 
That is, a quality that it has qua thing renders it fit to be a representamen. Thus, 
anything is fit to be a Substitute for anything that it is like” (Peirce CP 2.276).26 
An example is a photograph, because it represents its object qua being sup-
posed to be perceptually similar to what it shows and is therefore deemed fit for 
serving as a substitute for it. 
Insofar as this classification of all signs into icons, indices, and symbols is 
exhaustive, it is not only the case that models must be classified as icons, but 
also that they have to be identified with them, that is, as long as we grant that 
they are “signs” at all.27 But signs they are, because, evidently, insofar as mod-
els are “models,” they are supposed to stand for or represent “something,” that 
is, semiotically, an object. Furthermore, the relation between this object and the 
model must necessarily be conceived of as a similarity relation, because a 
model, first, does not have the primary purpose of showing that something 
exists or exerts an actual influence, as an “index” does; nor does the relation 
between model and object primarily exist because of an arbitrary or habitual 
connection between these things, as is the case with “symbols.”28 Rather mod-
els are supposed to directly “show” what they stand for and, accordingly, we 
                                                                                                                                
too far to explicate the intricate details relating to this classification; for some insights, see 
Peirce CP 2.247-249 and 4.447-448 and cf. Peirce CP 1.369. There are different (though not 
incompatible, but complementary) classifications of all signs according to different criteria; 
for a thorough and insightful discussion see Jappy (2016, 2017). 
26  This definition is based on Peirce’s theory of categories; see, e.g., Peirce CP 1.417; 1.300-
353; 1.545-567; and 7.327-332; as well as Peirce L 104 (1904). For the conceptual role of 
Peirce’s three fundamental categories for the definition of sign, see Peirce CP 2.242. 
27 This is one of the main differences to approaches to understanding models from a semiotic 
perspective that have been put forward. Cf., e.g., Ljungberg (2016) who equates models with 
“diagrammatical models” exclusively (on this form of model, see below). 
28  That an icon (model) is defined as having a similarity relation to its object does not imply 
that the similarity relation itself is sufficient for letting something be an icon (model), pace 
Frigg and Nguyen (2017, ch. 4). It has been denied that models are necessarily similar to 
their objects, e.g., by Suárez (2003); on this position, however, see Poznic (2016).  
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want to “inspect” them in order to gain acquaintance with, and knowledge 
about, what they represent as well as use them as a more accessible “substitute” 
for their objects that mediates between theory and “reality.”29  
In effect, models are icons, and icons are models. We can further refine this 
insight by availing of Peirce’s, once again exhaustive, classification of all icons 
into three separate classes (Peirce CP 2.277).30 The criterion for this classifica-
tion is the specific type (or “quality”) of similarity that is involved in the iconic 
sign relation. There are exactly three types: in principle, a similarity can either 
relate to simple (“monadic”) qualities, that is qualities as such, such as the 
quality an object has with regard to its color; or, second, to qualities that are 
expressible in the form of two-term (dyadic) relations, that is relations that 
have, according to Peirce, an “existential” or “real” nature and are supposed to 
actually belong to something; or, third, to qualities consisting of three terms, 
which are, according to Peirce, nothing but “semiotic” qualities, that is, quali-
ties that involve a “sign” relation. Evidently, this differentiation is based on the 
minimal number of relata involved in describing the respective qualities, in 
accordance with Peirce’s relation-based notion of category:31 monadic qualities 
are what they are in and of themselves (“firstness”); dyadic qualities are what 
they are due to some form of pairwise or, in another word, direct interaction 
(“secondness”); and, finally, triadic qualities are what they are due to involving 
something that connects two other things (“thirdness”). The single relata of 
these relations, however, do not have to have a simple constitution themselves. 
For example, also a composite variegated pattern of different colors can be 
classified as monadic quality insofar as each partial color is what it is due to 
itself and not because it stands in a specific direct relation to any other color of 
the pattern. 
The resulting types of icon/model are “images,” “diagrams,” and “meta-
phors”:32  
1) “Images” represent their objects by representing simple qualities of their 
objects by way of exhibiting equivalent simple qualities of their own. 
This could be, for example, photographs, toy models, or our perceptual 
content in general. “Images” therefore are not confined to visual images, 
despite their name. There are also audible images, tactile images, audi-
ble-tactile-visual images and so on; there is no restriction as to the medi-
um (or media) in which these icons manifest themselves. “Images” as de-
                                                             
29  On models as mediators, see the essays collected in Morrison and Morgan (1999a), especially 
Morrison and Morgan (1999c); see also Blättler (2015).  
30  For a detailed explication of this classification, which Peirce only gives at this place in a 
notoriously dense and obscure formulation, see Lattmann (2012). 
31  On the notion of quality in general, see Peirce CP 1.422-6.  
32  See Ciula and Eide (2017) for an application of this classification to models in the digital 
humanities. 
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fined by Peirce, therefore, need not be image-like in the common sense at 
all.33  
2) “Diagrams” represent their objects by representing dyadic qualities of 
their objects by way of exhibiting equivalent dyadic qualities of their 
own, that is qualities that can be described by way of direct or pairwise 
relations. Examples are mathematical diagrams as we find them in Eu-
clid’s Elements, for their representational quality is the sum of all the 
mathematical relations among its elements, but each of these elements 
has a specific direct relation to any other element of the diagram that can 
be expressed independently of the relations to all the other elements. For 
example, in a diagram that features a circle that is bisected by a diameter, 
the diameter has a specific direct relation to the circumference for which 
the specific direct relation of the circumference to, say, the center of the 
circle is of no relevance.34  
3) “Metaphors” represent their objects by representing triadic, that is semi-
otic, qualities of their objects by way of exhibiting equivalent semiotic 
qualities of their own. An example is the metaphor “Achilles is a lion,” in 
the framework of which sentence the sign “lion” is assigned an uncom-
mon representational quality for what the name Achilles habitually stands 
for.35 Insofar as metaphors necessarily involve another icon and thus 
model, they can be regarded as meta-models that allow us to experiment 
with the consequences of using something as a model for another thing, 
here of using the (image) icon implied by the symbol “lion” for repre-
senting Achilles.36  
Of these three types of model, it is mainly diagrammatical models that are 
relevant in scientific and digital humanities research. In these contexts, models 
are often used to represent, show, and bring to light qualities that are supposed 
to be essential relational properties of their objects that belong to their “real” 
constitution. Accordingly, diagrammatical models are supposed to lay open the 
objective nature of things and, at the same, time make it accessible to direct 
perception.  
                                                             
33  It is a pervasive feature of Peirce’s terminology that he often uses traditional names for 
objects that he redefines in a most abstract sense, but for which the things denoted by the 
terms as commonly understood can serve as an example. As is obvious in the case of “imag-
es,” this method can lead to severe misunderstandings, for it seems to be implied that this 
type of sign is restricted to only visual images. This impression, however, would be mistaken. 
34  See Lattmann (2018) for a model-theoretic analysis of those diagrams that were used in 
ancient mathematics and especially Euclid’s Elements. Peirce’s theory of the diagram has 
been subject to lively discussion in recent times, especially in semiotic studies; see, e.g., 
Stjernfelt (2007), Queiroz and Stjernfelt (2011), and Krämer and Ljungberg (2016). 
35  For an explication of Peirce’s metaphor theory, see Lattmann (2012). 
36  Cf. Ciula and Eide (2017, i35). 
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However, as is the case with “images,” the class of “diagrams” is not re-
stricted to visual or even mathematical diagrams.37 The notion of “diagram” 
includes any icon that is meant to exhibit dyadic relations. In particular, this 
also applies to mathematical formulas and most computer simulations, for they, 
too, directly represent and exhibit (and not only express or describe) quantita-
tive direct relations that are relevant for what the respective things are supposed 
to be in “reality” (see Peirce CP 2.282 and 4.530). As such signs they are noth-
ing but icons, even if they are composed of, and formulated by way of, “sym-
bols,” namely the mathematical symbols as defined by the theory of mathemat-
ics. Accordingly, a map can still be regarded as an icon, and especially a 
diagrammatical model, if it also includes the non-iconic conventional names of 
the places depicted on it graphically. In short, any representation acts as a “dia-
grammatical model” that is used to iconically make accessible some sort of 
(static or dynamic) “structure” (or “pattern”) that a thing is supposed to have or 
show, irrespective of which semiotic nature its constituent parts have.38  
Evidently, “diagrams” as defined by Peirce play a central role in research. 
However, the two other classes of model are important, too. On the one hand, 
“images” can, among other things, convey a (so-to-speak) first-hand impres-
sion of the objects of study, for example, small replicas or reconstructions of 
ancient buildings, such as digital 3D models. On the other hand, metaphors 
allow us to create new concepts and explore hitherto unknown areas, in particu-
lar by transferring ideas from one area to another by semiotically equating them 
on the basis of postulating that they are similar, in whatever way it may be. For 
example, the methods developed in Classical philology by Karl Lachmann and 
others for creating stemmata of texts for editorial purposes were fruitfully put 
to use in the middle of the twentieth century in a biological context for describ-
ing evolutionary processes in the then new field of genetics.39 Given this, meta-
phors are one of the most fundamental bases of human creativity, and they play 
an important role in modeling, too, especially as heuristic tools in the context 
of exploring new fields of research.40  
                                                             
37  This is a most important point for understanding Peirce’s theory of diagrams. Cf., e.g., 
Bechtel (2017) and Abrahamsen and Bechtel (2015) who, despite demonstrating the im-
portance of diagrams for scientific research, presuppose that the notion of diagram is con-
fined to (loosely speaking) visual diagrammatical (in the traditional sense) drawings.  
38  The equivalence (or at least, similarity) of the notions of “structure” and “pattern” in this 
regard might be particularly interesting from the perspective of the history of the humani-
ties, which can be aptly described as a history of pattern-seeking: see Bod (2013a); cf. brief-
ly Bod (2013b). 
39  For this example, see Bod (2015). 
40  This can already be observed at the beginning of Western science in ancient Greece: see 
Lattmann (2015, 2016). 
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3. Modeling Icons 
In the final section of this paper, I want to point out some of the implications 
that follow from the understanding of models I have sketched in the previous 
section. In so doing, I hope to contribute to shedding light on the practical 
dimension of modeling, in particular in the field of digital humanities. In short, 
the train of thought is the following: (1) Models are not the things themselves; 
(2) from which it follows that models do not represent their objects completely, 
but in a complex way; (3) that is, in modeling we establish a mapping relation 
between the properties of the model and its object, which mapping relation 
depends upon a specific theoretical framework; (4) because of which models 
are not theories; (5) but nonetheless they are, due to the similarity to their ob-
jects, the only basis of genuine creativity and, therefore, progress in research.  
(1) Models are non-identical to what they are a model of; they are not the 
things themselves. For example, a computer-generated 3D model of the Parthe-
non is not the Parthenon itself; a social network model of the Athenian elite of 
the 5th century BCE is not the historical social network itself; and a map of the 
ancient world is not the ancient world itself. At first sight, this seems to be a 
trivial point to make, but actually this is not so. We all too often forget that we 
are just investigating the model and not the original thing itself. The reason for 
this misapprehension is obvious: one of the fundamental presuppositions of 
modeling is that the model is similar to its object and therefore a well-suited 
substitute for it. But as similar as the model might be to its “real” object, it will 
in principle never be anything but a substitute. 
This fact has far-reaching consequences, in particular with regard to the va-
lidity of the results that can be achieved by modeling: all the knowledge mod-
els can provide primarily and in principle relates only to the models themselves 
and not to their objects, that is, those things we are interested in investigating in 
the first place. Accordingly, models cannot provide per se true insights into 
these objects. Instead they provide only potentially true insights, which always 
have to be vetted and validated. The general way of doing so consists of, after 
having completed an abductive step by creating the model itself, a deductive 
step by which we explore what must be true if the results given by the model 
were true indeed; and an inductive step by which we check these implications 
against “reality” (amounting to some sort of “experiment”), that is, of course, 
as far as this is necessary and possible at all. This process might lead to a better 
model, if need be by iterating it until the model is judged to be sufficiently 
good enough.41 Of course, especially in historical studies, one of the main 
                                                             
41  According to Peirce, this is the general method of acquiring knowledge: Peirce CP 2.773-8; 
2.641-4. Cf. Liatsi (2006) on the application of this method in historical and especially Clas-
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problems and challenges consists in implementing the last, inductive step, 
given the scarcity of data as well as the fact that we can only use historical 
sources and are not able to do any direct experiments.42  
(2) This leads to the second point. Because models are not the original ob-
jects themselves, but independent things of their own right that are intentionally 
used as “models” by treating them as similar to, and thus a substitute for, the 
original objects,43 models do stand for, and represent, their objects, but in prin-
ciple they do not do so completely. Instead they stand for their objects, as every 
sign by definition does, with respect to only select properties. For example, a 
treebank that consists of, and represents, sets of syntactical dependencies as 
they manifest themselves in ancient Greek sentences does, on the one hand, 
contain representations of the sentences themselves, but these representations 
only relate to their syntactical structure, and this without even taking into ac-
count their combination in texts beyond the single sentence. In view of this, it 
is in principle mandatory to always be clear about what a model is supposed to 
represent; in the case of treebanks, this would only be the syntactical depend-
encies the single sentences exhibit, not the sentences in their complete com-
plexity or their comprehensive meaning in their pragmatic context etc.44  
Furthermore, the fact that models represent their objects only with regard to 
select properties is not only a matter of including and excluding some of the 
properties in the model; in the process of modeling a more complex process 
takes place. For example, a political map of the ancient world and its semiotic 
object do not share the property of size; furthermore, the map displays proper-
ties that the original object does not possess, such as lines denoting borders; 
and it lacks properties that the original object does possess, such as the differ-
ent heights of the terrain. Models, therefore, are not merely simplified, abstract 
versions of their original objects. Modeling often involves a sophisticated 
transformation of properties between original thing and model. Of course, this 
can have non-intended, non-trivial consequences, beyond just, e.g., looking for 
a line on the ground at the border of the “real” city of Athens. For example, in 
                                                                                                                                
sical Studies. For computer simulations of this epistemological model, see Pauwels and Bod 
(2013). 
42  The same problem exists in several other fields of study and in particular in many areas of 
science: for example, an “experiment” is as impossible in astrophysics as it is in historical 
studies. 
43  See Ciula and Marras (2016) on the pragmatic dimension of modeling in the digital humani-
ties. 
44  Of course, this does not exclude the possibility that the single sentences contain infor-
mation that points beyond the sentences themselves and could be fruitfully analyzed by 
sophisticated methods to yield insights into relevant properties of the whole text; cf., e.g., 
van Cranenburgh and Bod (2017). The integrative combination of the tools and methods of 
current digital humanities research with the traditional hermeneutical toolbox might be the 
future goal of the development of the humanities at large; Bod (2013b) aptly calls this 
“Humanities 3.0.” 
HSR Suppl. 31 (2018)  │  137 
treebanks there is no way to adequately represent syntactical ambiguities; in-
stead, one has to make a clear-cut decision as to which syntactical function 
each element in a sentence has. This approach, however, fails at places where 
the ambiguity is an integral part of the meaning of the sentences, such as in 
those jokes or riddles whose very being a joke or a riddle essentially depends 
on the actual ambiguity of their syntactical structure. 
(3) Using something as a model requires that one choose properties of the 
original that are to be represented by the model. How then does one choose 
these properties? In principle, this choice is arbitrary and subjective. As per the 
general definition of sign, it always depends upon that person (or entity) for 
whom (or which) something serves as a model. For example, someone may 
choose to regard a freehand drawing of some lines as a map of ancient Greece, 
even if no one else agreed; or one person might prefer to have the map repre-
sent political borders while another one might prefer to have it represent road-
ways. However, as arbitrary and subjective as this choice in principle is, it is 
always guided by, and takes place within, a theoretical framework, most broad-
ly construed.  
According to this framework, first, those attributes are selected that the 
model is thought to possess (“model attributes”); second, those attributes are 
selected that the model as a sign is thought to exhibit as the representation of its 
original (“syntactical attributes”); and, finally, a specific mapping relation is 
established that maps these two sets of attributes onto each other. This mapping 
relation (implicitly or explicitly) defines what the iconic similarity actually is 
that is thought to exist between the model and the original. Accordingly, the 
iconic similarity between the model and its object is only postulated by using 
something as a model, and, in effect, the judgment on how exactly the model 
and its object are similar is arbitrary and subjective, too, and does not depend 
on any “objective” similarity between them.  
The theoretical framework within which the modeling process takes place 
need not be a full-fledged “theory,” e.g., a sophisticated linguistic theory in the 
case of treebank analyses. Rather, any “theoretical” perspective, most broadly 
construed, can serve as a framework, even if only the (set of) notions provided 
by the natural language. As a rule, there is no necessity to choose any one 
specific theoretical framework; for example, we may decide to draw a map in 
accordance with what the natural language implies are features of a “map,” or 
we can decide to draw a map according to strictly technical cartographic stand-
ards. Either map, however, will be a “map” and as such a model; and in any 
case, what each specific “map” means and what its semantic content is will be 
determined by the theoretical framework within which the mapping relation is 
established.  
The choice of the theoretical framework all but determines the results we 
can achieve by using a specific model. For example, in treebanks we can use 
different grammatical frameworks for describing the syntactical dependencies 
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in a sentence and each choice provides us with a different set of options for 
classification.45 In effect, the explicit and implicit theoretical frameworks we 
have to use in modeling not only enable the building and use of models, but at 
the same time also determine their meaning and heuristic value. An important 
consequence in the digital humanities is that the basic setup of computers and 
the theoretical presuppositions of computer science become (implicit or explic-
it) presuppositions of digital models, too. For example, since we do not use 
analog computers and no infinite-precision real numbers can be used, in com-
puter simulations of physical processes the parameter of time is in effect con-
ceived of as being not continuous, but discrete, with all the obvious ramifica-
tions as to the precision and validity of the results, especially in non-linear 
contexts.  
(4) Though models always have a theoretical framework, they are neither 
“theories” nor “descriptions,” even if, of course, theories can imply and de-
scriptions can describe (and thus effectively establish) models.46 This is implied 
by the fundamental definition of models as icons, which rules out that they are 
truth-apt signs, since icons are (so-called) “rhemes” which are in principle non-
truth-apt. Theories, on the other hand, are to be classified as complex truth-apt 
“symbolic” signs, namely (so-called) “arguments” or at least “dicisigns.”47  
It directly follows that what models stand for, and therefore a part of their 
“meaning,” is not determined by the constitution of the thing acting as the 
model itself, because the relation between sign and object is by definition nei-
                                                             
45  To give an instructive example from Classical Studies, the “Ancient Greek Dependency Tree-
bank” (<https://perseusdl.github.io/treebank_data/>) uses an annotation scheme that is 
based on Smyth (1956); see Celano (2016). However, this grammar is, with regard to the 
syntactical phenomena that are covered, less suitable from a scholarly perspective than, e.g., 
both Kühner and Gerth (1898-1904) whose classificatory scheme is arguably more detailed, 
complete, and adequate (cf., e.g., the description of conditional sentences) and Schwyzer 
(1988/1990) who describes the phenomena from a linguistically more up-to-date perspec-
tive. Even if, as Celano (2016) holds, the syntactical categories provided by Smyth’s gram-
mar (1956) might be relatively easy to implement, it is evident that the choice of this 
grammar will not in a few cases lead to non-trivial differences in the results of the syntacti-
cal analyses, with obvious consequences for the outcome of any further statistical analyses.  
46  For the latter, an instructive example is Euclid’s Elements, one of the first and for the history 
of science most important and influential exemplars of systematic mathematical modeling; 
see Lattmann (2018); cf. Asper (2007) on the general characteristic of this treatise and its 
cultural-historical context at large. 
47  The details of the threefold classification of all signs into rhemes, dicisigns, and arguments 
are not relevant here; see Peirce CP 2.250-253. This classification is independent of, and 
orthogonal to, the one into icons, indices, and symbols, for it does not relate to the relation 
between sign and object, but to the relation between sign and interpretant: see Peirce CP 
2.243. On propositions (“dicisigns”/”dicent signs”) see Peirce CP 2.309-388 and Stjernfelt 
(2015). An icon is by definition a rheme (see Peirce CP 2.250 and 2.255) and in particular 
not a dicisign (see Peirce CP 2.314). An obvious implication of the fact that theories are ar-
guments (or dicisigns) is that theories are (composite and complex) semiotic representations 
and therefore signs, too.  
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ther independently fixed by an actually existing relation between these two 
things nor habitualized as in the case of “indices” and “symbols,” respective-
ly.48 Technically, the object of the model is what the object of the model could 
be, for models are signs of potentiality.49 In consequence, all our interpretations 
(and “uses”) of models, insofar as they are applied to anything beyond the 
model itself (its object etc.), are not pre-determined by the model itself; trans-
parent examples are obscure metaphors. However, the theoretical framework of 
a model often acts as a counteracting force that guides our interpretations of the 
model. For example, whereas the natural language in most cases allows a large 
number of different and competing interpretations of a mathematical diagram, 
our theoretical understanding of mathematical diagrams suggests a more or less 
rigid and technical interpretation of any mathematical diagram, at least with 
regard to those aspects that are deemed relevant from the viewpoint of mathe-
matics. Nonetheless, this lack of interpretative freedom is probably a sign of 
rather mature theories, whereas especially in new fields of research we might 
expect to witness a heuristic use of models that, by applying the general meth-
od of acquiring knowledge as described above, successively reduces the vast 
number of possible interpretations of the models in question. Especially in such 
a context, the use of models can be regarded as a substitute for experimenta-
tion, especially in the (digital) humanities.50 
(5) This finally leads to recognizing what, arguably, the greatest benefit of 
modeling is. Even if models cannot exhibit any reason for why they might be 
adequate or not, what they can do is, as some form of embodied knowledge 
that can be directly inspected and investigated, mediate between theory and 
“real” thing, and this by iconically displaying and showing those properties of 
the original thing that would otherwise not be perceivable at all, even if only in 
                                                             
48  It is worth stressing that models in principle have a “meaning.” As Ciula and Marras (2016) 
remark, it directly follows that models are not only tools, but also genuine objects of study 
for the humanities. This also relates to the models that are used in scientific research. 
49  Cf. Peirce CP 2.247: “An Icon is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by 
virtue of characters of its own, and which it possesses, just the same, whether any such Ob-
ject actually exists or not.” On the connection between the notions of monadic quality and 
potentiality see Peirce CP 1.422-426. Describing models as signs of potentiality is preferable 
to regarding them as something similar to (literary) fiction: see, e.g., Frigg (2010a, 2010b). In 
effect, this invalidates the criticism raised against the similarity view of models; cf. Frigg 
and Nguyen (2017, ch. 4). Another point worth noting is that Peirce’s definition of icon im-
plies that the widespread use of the term “ontology” in computer science in the context of 
modeling is misleading, all the more so as it ignores the fact that any model relation is de-
pendent on the pragmatic use of something as a model, with the consequence that any sim-
ilarity between model and object depends on the judgment of the model user; cf. Ciula and 
Marras (2016). 
50 Cf. Stjernfelt (2011), especially on the usefulness of diagrams for experimentation. This is 
one of the reasons why Peirce developed the theory of “existential graphs”; cf. Peirce MS 
514 (1909) and, recently, Sowa (2000) who took up that theory for a comprehensive theory 
of knowledge representation from a contemporary perspective.  
HSR Suppl. 31 (2018)  │  140 
the mode of potentiality and in the framework of a theory that guides our expli-
cations of the model. Given this, models can count as the most basic, if not 
only, source of genuine creativity. This is made clear by Peirce himself when 
he states the following regarding the usefulness of icons (and thus models) in 
general: “[A] great distinguishing property of the icon is that by the direct 
observation of it other truths concerning its object can be discovered than those 
which suffice to determine its construction. […] Given a conventional or other 
general sign of an object, to deduce any other truth than that which it explicitly 
signifies, it is necessary, in all cases, to replace that sign by an icon” (Peirce CP 
2.279).51 Though simple or complex “symbols,” such as definitions, proposi-
tions, descriptions and theories, can represent and convey analytic knowledge 
and “truth” proper, only models can lead to genuinely novel insights. Models, 
therefore, form the fundamental and indispensable basis for progress in scien-
tific as well as in digital humanities research.  
4. Discussion 
Gunnar Olsson’s Questions 
Gunnar Olsson addressed the importance of translation for being a human. He 
describes the human being as a genuinely semiotic animal whose life consists 
of translating signs between the areas of the arts, science, and religion. To each 
of these areas, he assigns one of the three fundamental types of sign according 
to Charles S. Peirce, namely icons to the arts, indices to science, and symbols 
to religion. In so doing, Gunnar Olsson locates the activity of translation at the 
core of the human condition, for we are doing nothing but constantly exchang-
ing signs for other signs in a never-ending interplay of identity and difference. 
My answers 
I find Gunnar Olsson’s perspective engaging and stimulating, especially from 
the viewpoint of model theory. If we understand models as icons on the lines of 
my position statement, it is just and only modeling, conceived of as thinking in 
the mode of iconicity, that provides us with, and actually is, the very source of 
the contents of human thought. Models are the first starting-points of each and 
every enquiry, and they are genuinely situated in the realm of creativity, that is 
the arts, most broadly construed. As such, these iconic signs are subsequently 
transformed by the activity of “translation,” not only into other models, but also 
into scientific “knowledge” and/or religious “belief.” But, as Gunnar Olsson’s 
position implies, the relevance of modeling does not stop there. The secondary 
indexical and symbolic signs do not serve as the final products of the semiotic 
                                                             
51  See Ciula and Eide (2017) on the creative aspects involved in modeling in the digital hu-
manities. 
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activity of human beings, but they can be, and actually are, used to create new 
signs in turn, in particular in the mode of iconicity. These new models provide 
us with further, ideally more advanced, starting-points of scientific and/or 
religious enquiry. In effect, models not only are the ultimate source of human 
thought and creativity, but, insofar as we cannot escape our being humans and 
thus living beings in space and time, they are, in principle, also informed and 
shaped by our previous states of mind; that is, in short, by who and what we 
are. Modeling, therefore, turns out to be an integral as well as indispensable 
part of what it means to be a human being indeed. 
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